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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate how regionalization trends might affect the performance of water governance in terms of 
three overarching performance criteria: legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. The empirical component of this paper draws 
from a case-study analysis of the wastewater utility in Zurich, Switzerland. The findings indicate that establishing competencies 
through the process of autonomization can lead to an increase in a utility’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness; yet there 
is a notable trade-off with legitimacy because such processes tend to decrease direct democratic influence.  
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1. Introduction 
Considering the profound changes currently occurring in the water sector in industrialized countries, this research 
focuses on the governance of water services in the Western European context.  In contrast to other utility sectors, the 
water sector has been less affected by liberalization reforms. There is, however, a general shift away from a statist 
paradigm and towards diverse governance modes in the water sector (Palaniappan, Cooley, Gleick, & Wolff, 2007).2
This change typically entails the spread of responsibilities among different actors (e.g., non-state actors such as 
private and civil societal) and across multiple centers of power at different political levels (Benz, 2001; Finger, 
Groenewegen, & Künneke, 2005). In this context, the regional level is emerging as a focal area within which water 
governance occurs. While regions are often understood as spanning multiple nation-states, this research addresses 
regions within nation-states.  
* Corresponding author Tel.: +41 44 823 5680; fax: +41 44 823 5028. 
E-mail address: eva.lieberherr@eawag.ch. 
2
 We use the term governance to refer to diverse modes of social coordination between interdependent actors. We thus depict a range of ideal-
type governance modes - from state control (hierarchy) to market competition - with network forms like  associations and partnerships in between 
(Jessop, 1998; Mayntz, 2006). 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
74  Eva Lieberherr. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 14 (2011) 73–89
Regional governance increasingly plays a central role in water governance in the Western European context as 
policymaking becomes rescaled at the level of a region (Fürst, 2007). Regional governance refers to collaborative 
problem-solving processes among actors that join together to tackle common tasks (e.g., wastewater treatment) as a 
result of functional interdependencies rather than political boundaries (Fürst, 2007). In the Western European 
context, single municipalities are increasingly overloaded with new duties (e.g., renovation of facilities and dealing 
with micro-pollutants) and conventional (e.g., fragmented) approaches are argued as not sufficing to accomplish 
tasks efficiently and effectively (Fürst, 2004; Schedler, 2003). Therefore, local governments engage in alternative 
strategies such as either merging or cooperating in network configurations (e.g., associations or alliances) to solve 
common problems (Klinke & Worch, under review). The focus of this research is on the latter approaches, where 
the municipalities maintain their autonomy. Since these reforms typically involve an organizational form that is in 
between the municipal (local) and constituent state level, this is referred to as reorganization at the regional level 
and the process is called regionalization (Benz, 2000).  
In terms of environmental governance, there is a movement to reorganize water management in terms of 
environmental regions - aligning institutional structures with the physical environment, e.g., river basins – as 
optimal units in order to enhance efficient and effective water governance. Another concept coupled with 
regionalization is professionalization, as it is argued that by forming larger organizational units at the regional level, 
the pooling of resources, for example, enables the availability of more money than under fragmentation. In this 
context, traditional legal norms and public law no longer suffice as there is increasing reliance on self-monitoring 
where the state takes a guiding rather than an interventionist stance (Fürst, 2007); yet such horizontal governance 
structures are interdependent with vertical structures and remain subject to governmental oversight. In fact, adequate 
supervision is argued as being essential to regional governance in order to ensure legitimacy (Benz, 2001). While 
some argue that in order to be considered a regional model, a region must have its own organization as with its own 
fiscal sovereignty (Glättli, 2007), others argue that regional governance entails “…horizontal coordination and 
cooperation between municipalities … [where] the participating local governments transfer political authority to the 
new arrangements” (Klinke & Worch, under review, p. 16). According to the latter definition, these new 
arrangements may involve such organizational forms as associations or consortia, which typically lack fiscal 
sovereignty. Yet both conceptualizations of regional governance seem to agree that the new forms cover a greater 
geographical area (than single municipalities in the prior arrangements). 
While the underlying logic of regional governance is that it will enable more efficient and effective 
implementation of goals and hence increase the long-term acceptance of policy (Benz, 2001), the institutional 
framework at the regional level is weaker than at the local and national levels (Benz, 2004), which might impede 
performance. Since the regional level can be described as “a political vacuum” in terms of political authority and 
competencies (Klinke & Worch, under review, p. 10) the institutional development of competencies and authority 
(in terms of independent decision-making rights about finances, personnel etc.) at the regional level becomes central 
(Benz, 2004). Increasing the competencies and authority at the regional level is argued as leading to more effective 
water governance in terms of problem-solving and attaining sustainable solutions (Klinke & Worch, under review). 
Such approaches may be coupled with processes like autonomization, which entail separating political decision-
making from operational and management decisions. As autonomization processes enable more strategic decision-
making at the operational level via increased competencies, they may serve as stepping stones for achieving 
regionalization with a stronger institutional framework. However, since such processes entail that decision-making 
becomes more removed from the political sphere (e.g., direct voter input) than in traditional local governance 
(Peters & Pierre, 2006), they are argued as undermining democratic structures insofar as they weaken democratic 
legitimacy requirements like accountability, responsiveness and governability (Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004; 
Warner et al. 2008; Kooiman 2002). While previously the state’s accountability to citizens was a focal criterion in 
the governance of public utility sectors (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998), current reforms often emphasize economic 
efficiency and output-effectiveness as major performance indicators in many OECD countries (Benz & 
Papadopoulus, 2006; Haque, 2001). Since water is a vital resource for life, has natural monopoly features and de 
facto exhibits public good characteristics (Kamm, 2006), only focusing on efficiency and output-oriented 
effectiveness performance can be problematic as this might lead to the neglect of the public interest in terms of 
universal water service provision. Empirical studies show that reforms solely focusing on the latter criteria in the 
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water sector have had mixed success (Araral, 2009; Perard, 2009). For example, disconnection rates were found to 
drastically rise following water privatization in England (Lobina & Hall, 2001).  
We argue that it is critical to acknowledge the tradeoffs between legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness in 
different contexts and under various governance modes. For instance, what may be more efficient and/or effective, 
may not be the most legitimate (Hendriks, 2009, p. 343). However, such research that addresses legitimacy along 
with effectiveness and efficiency as evaluative criteria, particularly with respect to environmental governance, is 
rather lacking (Newig & Fritsch, 2009). While governance studies address effectiveness and legitimacy, they fail to 
combine these with efficiency (Karlsson-Vinkhuyen & Vihma, 2009). Conversely, economic studies focus on 
efficiency and effectiveness, while neglecting legitimacy. This paper thus includes all three criteria and explores the 
following questions: 1) to what extent might regionalization (with a focus on autonomization as a stepping stone) 
affect the performance of water governance in terms of efficiency, legitimacy and effectiveness? And 2) what are the 
tradeoffs between efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy?  
The empirical component of this paper draws from a case-study analysis of the wastewater utility in Zurich, 
Switzerland: the wastewater division in the municipal department for Waste Disposal and Recycling (WDR). While 
the focus is on the single case in Zurich, references will be made to contrasting cases in order to draw some 
comparisons. The paper is structured as follows: an analytical framework for measuring performance is developed in 
section 2. The methods are then outlined in section 3. Next, section 4 and 5 present the results of the case-study, 
which indicate that establishing competencies and authority through the process of autonomization can lead to an 
increase in a utility’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, it is argued that autonomization might 
serve as a stepping stone for a utility to regionalize and thus increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Yet there is a 
notable trade-off with legitimacy because such processes tend to decrease direct democratic influence. Section 6 
provides a discussion and section 7 concludes this paper by exploring potential trajectories for our case and raising 
questions for future research.  
2. Theoretical background: an analytical framework for evaluating water governance 
In order to evaluate how a water utility performs in the context of regionalization, we employ an analytical 
framework that enables evaluating the performance of a water utility in terms of legitimacy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in relation to governance dimensions. Efficiency and effectiveness are predominant criteria applied in 
environmental research (Bernauer, 1995; Howlett, 2009; O’Neill, Balsiger, & VanDeveer, 2004). Yet focusing only 
on the latter two criteria is insufficient as policymaking involves more than objective decision-making since it can 
entail moral judgment (Dahl, 1985; Dryzek, 1990). Moreover, focusing solely on market values such as efficiency 
and effectiveness in terms of productivity, cost-utility and customer satisfaction is argued as leading to the erosion 
of public service values such as upholding the public interest (e.g., universal service provision, accountability, 
public trust) (Haque, 2001). In the context of transformation from mainly state involvement in the provision of water 
services to the inclusion of diverse actors, legitimacy is becoming a central concern. While under state control, 
democratic legitimacy is typically ascertained via citizen’s equal rights to vote for decision-makers, altered 
governance modes lead to central questions regarding how legitimacy (particularly in terms of accountability) can 
be maintained (Haque, 2001; Schmelzle, 2008). Legitimacy is also an important element to consider when assessing 
governance because in order to be effective over the long-term, policies and regulations must be viewed as 
legitimate; a legitimacy deficit weakens public support and provision of resources (Stoker, 1998). 
These three criteria serve as the performance dimensions that are the dependent (or response) variables. We 
derived the analytic requirements via different theoretical perspectives in a previous paper.3 We now draw indicators 
from this prior work and supplement them with practical water sector performance indicators delineated by the 
3
 We drew from governance theory (stemming from German Steuerungstheorie) (Mayntz, 2003, 2006) and new institutional economics 
(Williamson, 2000) to derive the analytic requirements of legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness in Lieberherr, Klinke and Finger. 2010. 
Transformation of governance in public policy: Theoretical considerations on how to analyze legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness in the water 
sector? presented at the 2010 IRSPM conference  
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International Water Association (IWA), World Bank (WB) reports and European Commission (EC) research 
(Alegre et al., 2007; Cardoso, Matos, Pinheiro, & Almeida, 2006; Saleth & Dinar, 1999). General performance 
measures typically involve design, input and process/implementation measures (throughput), as well as output, 
outcome and impact measures (Bamberger, Rugh, & Mabry, 2006). We combine the criteria and indicators in an 
analytical framework that takes into account that legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness are interdependent, 
involve trade-offs and have multiple applications. Table 1 outlines the main and secondary indicators for the three 
criteria. Our focus here is on indicators relevant to the regionalization discourse: 1) legitimacy in terms of inclusion 
and representativeness, as well as transparency and accountability; 2) organizational and dynamic efficiency and 3) 
effectiveness in terms of decision-making processes, problems-solving (e.g., outputs -achievement of goals, 
outcomes and impacts of policymaking) and a utilities’ ability to adjust flexibly and find sustainable solutions (e.g., 
integrated water management). Thus both the political processes affecting a water utility (in terms of input and 
output) as well as the organization itself can be evaluated. 
Table 1: Evaluation criteria and indicators
In order to contextualize the performance of a water utility, we employ governance dimensions as the 
independent (or explanatory) variables. We operationalize governance based on the following dimensions: 1) 
structural elements, 2) regulatory style and 3) actors. Structural elements pertain to the degree of vertical and 
horizontal division of responsibilities and the state-society relation (Lenschow, 1999). These features are determined 
by legal, policy and administrative frames, which relate to the degree of the state’s role in the provision of goods and 
services versus outsourcing/privatization. The regulatory style refers to the mode of control, i.e., the tools used to 
control and steer (Lenschow, 1999). The actors dimension relates to the actors that play a major role in the decision-
making and in the provision of water services, e.g., state versus non-state.
3. Methods 
We choose a qualitative case-study methodology because it is useful to understand complex phenomena, where 
the context affects the case, there are many uncontrollable variables, and the case is a real-world situation (Yin, 
2003). The case-study approach enables analytic generalization rather than statistical generalization (Yin, 1994), 
4
 Economies of scale: “unit costs decrease as the capacity increases, reducing marginal costs with higher performance” (Maurer, Wolfram, & 
Herlyn, 2009, p. 1). 
Criteria Main indicator Secondary indicators 
Fair access & decision-making rights – relevant actors included in decision-making 
process 
Inclusion & 
representativeness 
Decision-making process – via negotiated rule-making, collective deliberation & 
discussion; relationship between operational & regulatory levels 
Transparency Public scrutiny – public consultation, direct/indirect channels of public influence 
Responsibility – clear division of roles & competencies 
Legitimacy 
Accountability 
Monitoring/enforcing – network inspections, water quality tests 
Professional management - business plans, strategic planning, inclusion of private actors
Personnel training – internal/external continuing education courses
Organizational 
Synergies via an integrating sub-sectors – e.g., water supply & wastewater 
Efficiency 
Dynamic Economies of scale4 – increased finances & know-how 
Decision-making Time to make decisions – autonomy, credibility of decisions 
Problem-solving Responsive/reflexive approaches – policy goals, policy problem & solution, compliance 
Learning – social & policy learning 
Effectiveness 
Adjustment flexibility 
Adaptive strategies – long-term, holistic, societal, economic & environmental needs 
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which involves comparing empirical analysis to a previously developed theory, or proposition. Correspondingly, the 
sampling is theoretical (rather than random or stratified) (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), where the case and unit of 
analysis are selected because they can illuminate a specific phenomenon.  
Switzerland is a noteworthy example of regional governance as recent studies have found that largely network 
forms at the regional level exist in the Swiss wastewater sector (Klinke & Worch, under review). Furthermore, as 
Switzerland practices consociational democracy, it has a history of horizontal steering with an emphasis on 
consensus and cooperation among diverse actors. In the context of decreasing public funding, increasing mandates 
via new regulations as well as perceived inflexibility and the stifling of operative decisions by rigid political control 
(Poldervaart, 2007; Schedler, 2003), there has been an emphasis on regionalization as well as means of control 
based on the premises of management (e.g., New Public Management, autonomization and corporatization) to 
improve economic efficiency and output-oriented effectiveness (Benz & Papadopoulus, 2006). These trends are 
valuable for assessing the trade-offs and tensions between efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. 
We select the wastewater utility managed by the WDR in the city of Zurich (in the canton of Zurich) as the unit 
of analysis because it can be considered a regional governance form as it is a communal consortium. In the Swiss 
water sector, a consortium typically involves binding contractual relationships under public law between two or 
more municipalities, where one municipality is dominant as its infrastructure and facilities are shared with the 
(typically) neighboring municipality (for a fee) (Herlyn & Maurer, 2007). Moreover, Zurich is an interesting case 
because the WDR has gone through an autonomization process, becoming a semi-autonomous public enterprise, 
which may serve as a stepping stone for it to expand its size and become a form of regional governance with 
institutionalized competencies and authority. Furthermore, the WDR has started to align its water management tasks 
with the river basin, hence focusing on an environmental region. While we are not claiming that this utility is 
representative of organizational forms in the Swiss wastewater sector (e.g., the treatment facility is the largest in the 
country), we deem it valuable to analyze this utility in the city of Zurich because it plays a central role in 
Switzerland as it is one of the country’s five metropolitan areas and the nation’s largest city. Focusing on an urban 
region is also pertinent as they are increasingly relevant to water governance research to the extent that urbanization 
is one of the most central phenomena affecting the provision of such public services like water. The limitation of 
this sampling is that it does not engage in a full comparative case-study analysis because it focuses on a single, in-
depth case-study of the utility in Zurich and only makes reference to contrasting cases (e.g., the wastewater utility in 
Berne) in the discussion as points of comparison. Moreover, while the focus is on the wastewater sub-sector, some 
comparisons with the water supply sub-sector are made insofar as is relevant for discussing integrated approaches. 
According to the mandate that case-studies involve multiple data sources (Scholz & Tietje, 2002) and the 
principle of triangulation, the empirical analysis is comprised of various forms of information gathering. The data 
sources include: 1) documentary information (e.g., reports, administrative documents, formal studies, informational 
bulletins, meeting minutes and evaluations); 2) archival records (e.g., databases, organizational records, survey 
data); 3) interviews - a) seven in-person expert interviews in 2009 and 2010 and b) ex-post analysis of ten expert 
interviews (conducted in 2007 and 2008). The interviewees include: experts at the federal level (from the Federal 
Institute of Aquatic Research - Eawag, the Federal Office of the Environment - FOEN, Swiss Water Agenda 21), 
consultants, cantonal officials (Basel-land, Zurich, Bern), members of the national water supply and gas association, 
a manager of the wastewater division in WDR, a short phone interview with an employee in the WDR, as well as a 
brief phone interview and e-mail exchange with a lawyer in Zurich. The sampling method for finding interviewee 
partners was purposive and convenience sampling. Based on the analytical framework, a semi-structured interview 
questionnaire guideline was developed that focused on: 1) types of organizational and regulatory forms in the Swiss 
water sector; 2) transformation occurring in the Swiss water sector and 3) relation/assessment of the different 
organizational and regulatory forms in terms of indicators of legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. In order to 
maintain anonymity, the interviews conducted in 2009/10 are referenced as expert 1 through 7 and the 2007/08 
interviews are referenced as ex-post 1 through 10. 
The cases are described as follows: first the governance dimensions are delineated and then these are evaluated 
based on the evaluative criteria in the analytical framework as well as themes that emerged from the data. 
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4. Governance dimensions 
The three governance dimensions - structural elements, regulatory style and actors - are described below. Since 
the regulatory and operational levels are interdependent, their interplay (in terms of division of responsibilities and 
regulatory style) is significant in terms of legitimacy, specifically with respect to accountability, which will be 
shown in the discussion. 
4.1. Structural elements: political structure & legal framework 
Water governance is dispersed across a three-tiered multi-level system in Switzerland: federal, cantonal and 
municipal (see table 2). Defined at the federal level, the main legal framework governing water resources in 
Switzerland is the federal 1991 Water Protection Law (WPL) (Eidgenossenschaft, 1991) and its related 1998 
ordinance (Bundesrat, 1998). As Switzerland’s political system is very close to a direct democracy, sovereignty lies 
with the citizens who participate and hence citizen participation is fostered (Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone, & Hill, 
2007). An important player at the federal level is the Federal Office of the Environment (FOEN). The FOEN has the 
right to address water resources protection, implement policy instruments and is responsible for supervising water 
resources management at the cantonal and municipal levels. Yet in terms of infrastructure, organization and 
management of the water sector, the FOEN has almost no competencies as the operational tasks are carried out by 
the cantons and municipalities. Hence, although the levels are hierarchically ordered under the federal level, the 
cantonal and municipal levels traditionally retain a high level of political sovereignty (Ladner, 2002). While the 
cantons hold all authoritative duties not clearly assigned to the national government in the federal constitution, the 
actual implementation of policies is typically delegated to the municipal level. Accordingly, municipalities hold the 
responsibility for building, operating and maintaining the water infrastructure. While the responsibility of ensuring 
water services is public (the water sector is predominantly governed by public law and water supply is considered a 
public function in Switzerland), specific tasks can be delegated to third parties. Yet typically the technical facilities 
(e.g., treatment plants) as well as the infrastructure network (e.g., pipelines) are owned by municipalities (Klinke & 
Worch, under review). 
Table 2: Institutional distribution of tasks in the Swiss multi-level system
Govt. level Tasks 
Federal Defines legal framework for water protection water standards 
Regulation of water resources: 
    - Administrative, legal, technical & financial control responsibilities 
Cantonal 
    - Responsibility for providing water services (can delegate to lower level) 
Municipal Typically responsible for providing water services 
Swiss water governance is traditionally marked by a strong sectoral orientation. Specifically, wastewater and 
water supply are typically managed by different organizations. There are, however, several multi-utility companies 
that integrate wastewater and water supply as well as gas and electricity (e.g., Stadtwerke). Yet more typically, water 
supply is integrated with gas and electricity, while wastewater is managed under the same roof as other waste 
products. There is a discussion to integrate the management of wastewater and the water supply sectors (under one 
organizational entity) in order to reap organizational synergies. Yet integrating wastewater and water supply at the 
organizational level is controversial in Switzerland as it is argued that associating drinking water with wastewater is 
not acceptable (Expert 1, 2009).  
Swiss water governance is also oriented around political rather than physical catchment boundaries. Yet a current 
discussion in the Swiss water world revolves around a shift towards a more holistic approach to water management, 
that is, towards focusing on environmental regions, e.g., river basins. Here a central question relates to finding an 
appropriate organizational structure oriented around the hydrological catchment area rather than political boundaries 
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(Vollenweider, 2006).  The future trend envisioned at the federal level involves moving away from sectoral/local 
governance and towards inter-sectoral and regional governance (Expert 3, 2009). The FOEN is active in providing 
information about integrated water management and regionalization and ideas are slowly infiltrating Swiss water 
management (Expert 3, 2009). However, while holistic planning and legal aspects have been addressed, the financial 
piece has not been solved yet (Expert 1, 2009). The financial aspect is particularly challenging with respect to 
transferring funds between political boundaries (in the case of intercommunal or intercantonal cooperation). 
Furthermore, it is predicted that costs in the wastewater sector will increase due to increasing tasks (e.g., the need to 
renovate and addressing micro-pollutants), which will necessitate extra funding (Herlyn & Maurer, 2007). Since 
governmental funding is decreasing, the rising costs will complicate things further as the extra money will most 
likely lead to an increase in user-fees, which is always controversial (Expert 1, 2009). To address such challenges, 
strategies such as regionalization and professionalization are promoted in the Swiss wastewater sector. These 
approaches are often argued to increase efficiency (in terms of reduced costs) and effectiveness as there is more 
professionalism through organization at the regional level (Pfammater et al., 2007; Expert 3, 2009). 
4.1.1. Structural elements - the case of Zurich’s wastewater system 
The structural elements important to the case are the regulatory (federal and cantonal) level as well as the 
operational; these are described in this respective order below. 
The regulatory level 
The focal regulatory actor in this research is the department for Waste, Water, Energy and Air (WWEA), which 
is the cantonal specialist department responsible for the implementation of the federal water protection law as well 
for monitoring the municipalities’ and private actors’ compliance (Zürich, 1974). The WWEA addresses both water 
supply and wastewater. The WWEA is ordered below the cantonal council (Regierungsrat) (Zürich, 1974) and the 
building directorate (Baudirektion) (Zürich, 1974) (see table 3). The WWEA has the authority to immediately 
intervene with municipalities and private actors when  there is actual or potential water pollution incidence (Zürich, 
1974). The WWEA’s role is both strategic and operational: its main goal is to develop and implement action plans 
but it also engages in advising (Amt für Abfall Wasser Energie und Luft, 2004). 
Table 3: Distribution of responsibilities and tasks in the Wastewater Sector in Canton Zurich
Institutional Scale Responsible entity Tasks 
Federal - Swiss confederation      
(bicameral parliament) 
- Defines the legal framework for water protection 
 - FOEN - Water protection strategies & policy instruments, no enforcement 
- Cantonal council - Overarching oversight 
- Building directorate - Overarching decision-making, monitoring local & regional levels 
Cantonal 
- Department for Waste, Water, 
Energy and Air 
- Direct monitoring of municipalities & setting standards; sets goals, plans & 
guidelines 
Municipal - Department for Waste Disposal 
and Recycling 
- Direct monitoring, implementation & operation of wastewater services tasks 
The operational level 
The municipalities in the canton of Zurich are responsible for the immediate monitoring of the compliance with 
federal and cantonal water protection laws (Zürich, 1974). While at the cantonal level, wastewater and water supply 
are integrated under the WWEA, at the municipal level, they remain separate. Our focus is on wastewater, where the 
responsible entity in the city of Zurich is the Service Division for the Civil Engineering and Waste Disposal and 
Recycling in the city’s department for Waste Disposal and Recycling (WDR). The WDR is a public enterprise with 
a Chief Executive Officer, five areas of operation and five respective general managers: 1) wastewater division, 2) 
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waste and city cleaning, 3) waste heating and energy, 4) administrative services and IT support, and 5) maintenance 
services. The focus of this paper is on the wastewater division in WDR (here after referred to as the Division), which 
includes the wastewater treatment facility (Werdhölzli) as well as the drainage system in the city of Zurich. The 
wastewater treatment facility was completed in 1985 and is the country’s largest, treating 70 to 90 million cubic-
meters of wastewater yearly. The drainage system in Zurich is 4,000 kilometers long (including the private sewer 
system) (Pauli, 2009). 
4.2. Regulatory style 
The regulatory style in the Swiss water sector seems to be cooperative as the cantons prefer giving 
recommendations rather than top-down mandates. Whereas historically, the federal and cantonal levels had some 
financial clout via subsidies that they could grant to municipalities for technical aspects in the water sector, today, 
they are only able to provide subsidies for specific purposes. This change weakens the state’s role, and while the 
cantons legally have the power to determine municipal autonomy, in reality, cantons rarely intervene. The current 
aim is to have self-sufficient utilities (e.g., full-cost coverage by fees); while certain cantons provide special (extra) 
financing or special instruments (e.g., wastewater funds), others forbid this practice (Poldervaart, 2007). In the 
canton of Zurich, the WWEA is perceived as playing more of an advising rather than a regulating role because it 
lacks authority: while it could previously use subsidies as steering tools, it no longer has these at its disposal. The 
perceived “mentality of municipalities is that if the canton cannot provide public funding, then it no longer has a 
say” (Ex-post 5, 2008). 
4.3. Actors 
The WDR is organized as a communal consortium where the city of Zurich is the dominant municipality that 
governs the Division. Six municipalities have contracts with the Division in order to have their wastewater treated in 
Zurich. The municipalities of Wallisellen, Kilchberg and Zollikon have all their wastewater treated in Zurich while 
Adliswil, Opfikon and Rümlang only have a part treated there. Each municipality has its unique contract (some are 
more than 80 years old). 
5. Evaluation of performance  
This section is presented according to the three evaluative criteria (legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness) and 
ordered according to the indicators (shown in table 1). It is also noted whether or not the indicators are found to have 
a causal link with regionalization and/or autonomization.  
5.1. Legitimacy 
5.1.1. Inclusion and transparency 
Due to the direct democratic system, it is argued that legitimacy is a precondition of change in Switzerland. 
Overall, policy-making is based on consensus and finding shared understanding prior to a public vote. However, in 
the case of the Division, no such democratic approach is taken vis-à-vis its contract municipalities as they have no 
decision-making rights; they only participate by paying the Division a fee in exchange for having their wastewater 
treated. The contract municipalities would like to have some decision-making clout and form a composite actor 
(Verbund), which would give them more rights. Yet according to the Division, this is only a hope of the 
municipalities because the Division has no interest in giving its contract municipalities any decision-making 
competencies. In contrast, within the Division, there seems to be an inclusive atmosphere as the management 
incorporates the goals of its employees and engages in goal formulation and position-fixing (Standortsbestimmung) 
exchanges with its personnel. Moreover, the Division’s relationship with the WWEA is not perceived as overly 
hierarchical as it is described as “very good” and “cooperative” with easy dialogue: “we have informal phone 
conversations whenever something comes up” (Ex-post 7, 2007). The above characteristics are not found as having 
a causal relationship with the autonomization process. However, if a communal consortium can be considered a 
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regional model (as we do in this research), then the Division’s hierarchical stance weakens this governance form’s 
legitimacy; this form of regionalization thus seems to weaken legitimacy in terms of inclusion and decision-making 
rights. 
As a consequence of autonomization, the Division has more financial freedom than before, which entails that the 
public has less direct influence. However, if there is a legal change or projects entail large sums of money, then 
there typically is a public consultation period (Vernehmlassung) and a public vote. Yet the Division has free 
discretion to make decisions about daily operations and finances for a budget of up to 100,000 Swiss francs. For a 
budget of up to 300,000 Swiss francs, the director of the WDR needs to approve and for a budget over 1,000,000 
Swiss francs, the city council must approve. In addition, project leaders and regular employees now have financial 
competencies: a project leader has discretion of finances of up to 25,000 Swiss francs and regular workers of up to 
5,000 (Ex-post 7, 2007). The research thus demonstrates a causal link between the Division’s autonomization 
process and increased flexibility regarding financial decision-making. Yet there is a trade-off with legitimacy as 
there is less direct democratic input. 
5.1.2. Accountability 
The WWEA and the Division’s responsibilities are summarized in table 4. While prior to autonomization, the 
WDR and hence also the Division lacked clear competencies, which often led to conflicts with the technical services 
and the Division, there has been a clarification of roles since the restructuring of the WDR (see organizational 
efficiency below). After autonomization, it is now clear that the general managers are responsible (and have 
authority) for their respective area of operation, which has reduced discussions and conflicts. There thus seems to be 
a causal link between autonomization and the clarification of roles and tasks, which increases accountability.  
Table 4: Division of responsibilities between the WWEA and WDR
Actor Tasks 
WWEA general drainage plan check every two to three years 
monitoring performance of WDR’s wastewater treatment facility four times a year with a general annual evaluation 
testing whether operators’ accuracy in measuring the water quality by testing the same sample (that the municipality already 
tested) in cantonal laboratory 
annual meetings with operator to discuss their yearly performance (issues a letter satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the operator) 
WDR controlling the operation, investments, personnel etc. of wastewater facility & sewerage system 
determining groundwater protection areas 
enactment & maintenance of drainage systems, treatment facilities & fee ordinances 
issuing ordinances regarding drainage system (must be approved by the building directorate) 
internal communications, personnel, services, business development/quality, legal service & controlling department 
responding to citizen complaints about discolored water waterways 
The WWEA is satisfied that the Division can accomplish the tasks of managing and running the wastewater 
treatment plant and drainage system rather independently. Moreover, the Division is essentially self-regulated where 
the WWEA conducts periodic tests. If there are any problems, the WWEA has a discussion with the operator, 
typically conducts a few more tests to see if the problem is ongoing and possibly issues a citation or a final warning 
if cheating or faulty measurements are repeatedly found. If problems still do not cease, then the responsible person 
may be fired. If there are continuous problems beyond the individual level, then there is a discussion with the 
WWEA, the Division, and the wastewater facility commission (Kläranlagenkommission) (comprised of the 
municipal councilors - Gemeinderäten). However, the canton is wary of intervening too closely with the municipal 
level. Despite this apprehension, if the WDR cannot guarantee the effective operation of the wastewater treatment 
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facility, then the canton takes-over. There appears to be no link between autonomization and the monitoring of
Division by the WWEA. 
Through our study we found that while the WWEA prefers making recommendations rather than mandate
wishes it had more clout in terms of positive incentives. For instance, the WWEA wanted to implement wastew
funds as it perceives this as a great steering instrument. Yet this was rejected by the cantonal council becaus
perceived political reasons. Specifically, the WWEA thinks that the council wants to curb the WWEA’s po
Moreover, the WWEA perceives that the direct democratic system in Switzerland is restrictive as this makes
cantonal councilors afraid of implementing something that will then make them unpopular in their constituency 
may cause them to loose their seat). The Division perceives the WWEA as being passive and wishes that it w
intervene more directly. While there does not appear to be a causal link between the autonomization of the Divi
and accountability, it seems that a decoupling of the WWEA from the political system might enable the WWE
exercise more clout. 
5.2. Efficiency 
5.2.1. Organizational efficiency 
The WDR went through an autonomization process as its legal form changed from a municipal agency (i.
bureau) to a semi-autonomous business enterprise in 2000. However, it remains under public law and is integrate
the city of Zurich, under direct oversight of the Zurich’s city council. As a business enterprise the WDR is relati
financially independent with its own accounting system (financed by infrastructure and wastewater fees), and
more discretion regarding financial decisions than before (see above). The treatment facility employs 85 wor
and the drainage system 116 (Pauli, 2009); the workforce is described as being well educated and professional 
post 7, 2007). Moreover, the Division seeks to achieve a high level of professionalism and strategic planning i
organization (Pauli, 2009) by accomplishing the following: 
• clearly defining goals and strategies in its business plan  
• system for cataloguing operational figures 
• instruments, platforms and networks as well as necessary resources (e.g., funding) for continuing education an
trainings (continuing education programs through Human Resources Department of the city of Zurich and 
internal educational programs and providing advice and funds for external courses) 
• special human resource computer software program (ERP-Standartsoftware SAP, HCM) in 2006 (stands for 
Enterprise Resource Planning and Human Capital Management), which led to more efficient and transparent 
processes that are beneficial for the workers and managers (Pauli, 2009) 
• information exchange event - “WDR Platform” (ERZ Plattform) - opportunity for internal exchange where 
relevant themes regarding management and leadership are discussed (Pauli, 2009) 
Through its restructuring, the “WDR was able to free itself a bit from the city hierarchy... and we use
freedom” and becoming more horizontal (Ex-post 7, 2007). The operator is now much freer than before in term
having the ability to change organizational aspects as he can now act more independent of daily poli
intervention. There thus appears to be a causal link between the Division’s autonomization and its organizati
efficiency as the process led to increased flexibility, strategic planning and professionalism of the organization.  
While the WDR has an integrated waste service management, addressing wastewater treatment, solid waste
city cleaning, as well as waste heating and energy, with a focus on recycling and re-using waste products, 
research found no sign of a discussion of integrating the sub-sector of water supply into its domain. Albeit
WWEA has integrated these two sub-sectors, there seems to be no such discussion at the operational level. Wh
might have been expected that a regionalization process, which typically tries to find synergies, might be cou
with integrating wastewater and water supply, this is not the case in terms of the Division’s reforms.
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. Dynamic efficiency 
While the Division already benefits from economies of scale, as it is a large facility with six contract 
cipalities, in the course of the autonomization process it also played with the idea of forming a new, larger 
nization, organized under private law (e.g., a joint-stock corporation) in order to increase efficiency in terms of 
ling tasks in a timely manner. Yet there appears to be no further discussion regarding the inclusion of private 
s as such a prospect would need heavy political discussion in an environment that seems averse to such 
ms. Moreover, the Division itself is critical of privatization reforms and views England as a bad example as it 
ribes the English water infrastructure as having been economically deteriorated since privatization.  
he Division, however, is thinking of expanding its organization as it might have its own biogas-burning facility: 
ad of shipping the dewatered sludge to waste incinerators, the Division would dispose of this internally. Beyond 
iogas facility, and as a continuation of the autonomization process, the Division is considering the prospect of 
ming a larger organization that would treat wastewater from additional municipalities and decouple itself even 
er from the “constraints of the city” (Ex-post 7, 2007). Despite the autonomization process that increased the 
sion’s flexibility, the Division believes that this decoupling from the municipal structure could go a step further: 
mally, the WDR (and hence also the Division) would remain an institution under public law but would have 
er service mandates with finances that are functionally oriented rather than tied to the city’s political system.  
eing closely coupled with the city of Zurich is perceived as a challenge for the Division. The canton of Zurich is 
ized as being parochial as there are stronger municipal autonomy sentiments than in other cantons (e.g., Berne), 
h tends to lead to blockages of mergers and expansions of organizations. While there was a movement to 
ement a regional model in the canton of Zurich, this was rejected. One explanation is that in Zurich politicians 
particularly afraid that wastewater workers will lose their jobs through mergers but experience has shown 
wise: when a wastewater facility (ARA Glatt) was closed, as the services were overtaken by the Division, no 
oyees were fired. While the Division argues that the time is not right to expand its organizational form, it sees 
following this trajectory. The Division’s goal is to become the operator of smaller municipalities’ wastewater 
ties and thus reap further benefits of economies of scale (see table 5 for pro expansion arguments and 
diments). The Division looks at the constituent state regions (Ländergebieten) in Germany as well as canton 
l-land, where the water services are provided at a broader (i.e., regional) level, as models of expansion for the 
sion. The canton of Zurich, however, typically opposes such expansion. Hence the socio-political atmosphere in 
anton of Zurich is perceived as restricting further regionalization trends.  
Table 5: Pro and con expansion arguments
o-expansion 
guments 
professional operations manager (rather than a single sewage works operator who is responsible for everything) 
many small facilities = inefficient, can maximize finances & know-how with larger organization 
promote regional integration - capitalize synergies, reduce task-loads 
extend operating times (e.g., to 12 instead of eight hours)  
more professional: project development, implementation, acquisition of funds  
improved exchange with politicians 
mpediments to 
pansion 
restrictive political climate 
municipal autonomy 
fear of loss of public jobs 
increased risk with only a single large facility: if there is a problem, then you immediately have a catastrophe; whereas 
if you have multiple small plants, then the risk is far more diffuse 
While the autonomization process has not directly affected the Division’s dynamic efficiency, as a regional form 
icing multiple municipalities), it can reap the benefits of economies of scale. Yet the Division seems to 
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continue on a regionalization-autonomization track, as it considers expanding its organizational form, which appears 
to be a result of the autonomization process.
5.3. Effectiveness 
5.3.1. Decision-making and problem-solving 
Effective decision-making overlaps with efficiency indicators as it relates to the time needed to make decisions, 
which can be considered a cost (i.e., inefficiency). However, if decision-making requires little time (e.g., does not 
need to go through political decision-making) but the results are not acceptable to the constituents, then the process 
may not be effective, even though it is efficient. Therefore, we place decision-making under effectiveness; finding a 
balance between flexibility/autonomy (i.e., more efficient decision-making) and legitimacy (e.g., tied to political 
decision-making) is a tough task. In the case of the Division, large projects and budgets that need to go through the 
political process of decision-making are often delayed, making the process less efficient. For example, if decisions 
have to go through the parliament, which is the case for large budgets (20 million), then the decision-making process 
takes three to five months. While it is perceived that there are too many interfaces between the city of Zurich and the 
Division concerning the accounting system, the Division has increased autonomy since its autonomization and can 
retain some flexibility, as for instance, it is able to vary the wastewater fee within a 10% range, which only needs the 
consultation of the city council, not with the entire municipal council or public vote. The financial decision-making 
process is the only component where operational decisions are still tightly coupled with political decision-making. 
For instance, the Division has the ability to hire and fire personnel as needed and can make contracts with other 
municipalities, without needing to go through a political decision-making process. While this increases the 
Division’s flexibility, it weakens its legitimacy as the public has less influence over its operations. There thus 
appears to be a causal link between autonomization and increased decision-making competencies, yet this also 
involves a trade-off with legitimacy. 
The Division engages in effective problem-solving as it has no problems passing the WWEA’s inspections 
(Pauli, 2009). The Division provides superior water quality (of the effluent water), and specifically, certain 
parameters (e.g. total organic carbon and nitrogen contents) are markedly below the legal threshold (Pauli, 2009). 
There is thus effective protection of the physical environment as the water resources (groundwater and surface 
waters) have a very high quality. Yet there is no observed causality between autonomization and water quality 
performance as the Division has historically provided quality services. 
5.3.2. Adjustment flexibility 
As defined in Table 1, adjustment flexibility is associated with long-term adaptive and integrated water 
management strategies as well as social and policy learning. In the context of long-term adaptive strategies, the 
Division’s objective is to be 100% self-sustainable in terms of energy needs and embeds such sustainable practices 
into its business plan. The Division also engages in integrated water management by holistically looking at the river 
Limmat (into which the effluent water is discharged) water catchment, specifically by addressing flooding and 
measures to re-naturalize the river. This not only helps to mitigate major flood damages but also improves the well-
being of the riparian ecosystem. While no direct causality in terms of autonomization and increased sustainable 
practices can be found, the clear implementation of sustainable practices into its business plans seems to have 
increased following autonomization. 
Within the Division, there has been a learning process due to the autonomization process of the WDR (described 
above). While the autonomization process is described as having been a major challenge for the organization, the 
outcome has been quite positive. The Division did not fire any employees during the restructuring process, it simply 
redefined their jobs and the incumbent employees could re-apply to these jobs. The employees are now described as 
being much more independent and communicative, which leads to shorter decision-making paths and more credible 
decisions, as those affected immediately settle the issue with most conflicts now being solved internally. Moreover, 
there are weekly meetings (lasting 1.5 hours) where all issues are discussed. A major challenge was for people 
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within the Division to learn how to work together in a team, where everyone has some responsibility. The Division 
initiated team-building exercises and conflict management courses - some of which were voluntary and others 
obligatory - so that the employees learned how to cope with conflicts, how to solve them within their team and to 
take responsibility (as autonomization entailed that the workers have more competencies than before). The 
autonomization process also led to more collaboration between the different areas of operation within the WDR, 
leading to the capitalization of synergies. These processes are said to have led to greater satisfaction among the 
workers in the Division, which is regarded as increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Division. Hence 
there appears to be a causal link between autonomization and increased efficiency and effectiveness in terms of 
interactions and operations within the Division (e.g., reducing transaction costs by solving conflicts internally).  
5.4. Summary 
In sum, table 6 shows the high level of performance of the Division in terms of legitimacy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (indicated by “+’s”). Only two strong negative indicators for the Division’s performance are found 
(indicated by “-’s”): 1) regarding inclusion, as the Division operates hierarchically and 2) regarding its lack of 
integrating water supply and wastewater. There are several areas where mixed success was found (indicated by 
“/’s”). Yet not all performance indicators are causally linked with regionalization or autonomization processes. 
Indicators are marked with grey shading where a causal link was found; darker grey indicates a stronger link.  
Table 6: Summary of results
Criteria Main indicator Performance summary 
- - contract municipalities are not given decision-making rights Inclusion 
+
- decision-making between WDR & WWEA seems to be based on negotiated rule-making & 
discussion; internal cooperative relationship as well as external with WWEA 
Transparency / - decreasing public scrutiny due to decoupling 
+ - clear division of roles and responsibilities 
Legitimacy 
Accountability 
 / - systematic monitoring & enforcement but WWEA lacks clout 
+ - professional management- business plans, strategic planning, computer software, 
cataloguing 
+ - offers personnel training – both internal/external continuing education courses; exchange 
platforms 
Organizational 
- - no synergies via an integrating water supply & wastewater 
Efficiency 
Dynamic + - already has a certain level of economies of scale & is considering to expand more 
Decision-making  / - some delay due to long political decision-making paths but also some flexibility 
Problem-solving + - division meets WWEA’s inspections, compliance with water quality standards 
+ - internal learning - how to be a team, conflict management 
Effective-ness 
Adjustment 
flexibility + - sustainable practices embedded in business plan: e.g., energy saving strategies, integrated 
management 
Key: + = stronger performance (achieving requirements of analytic indicator); / = mixed success; -  = weaker (not achieving requirements); grey 
= causal link with regionalization and/or autonomization 
6. Discussion 
Returning to the first research question, to what extent might regionalization (with a focus on autonomization as a 
stepping stone) affect the performance of water governance in terms of efficiency, legitimacy and effectiveness, 
there is a positive correlation between autonomization and the utilities’ performance in terms of 1) clarifying roles 
and responsibilities, 2) an increase in professional management with more strategic planning and flexibility than 
before, 3) improved internal interactions (in terms of adjustment flexibility) as the employees in the Division have 
gone through a learning process and now can operate as a team and 4) increasing sustainable practices (to a certain 
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extent). Yet there appears to be a negative relationship between autonomization and transparency (as the public 
sphere has less oversight and control). In terms of effective decision-making, the autonomization process enabled 
the Division to have more flexibility, yet the Division wants more freedom as it still perceives itself as being 
restricted by the political system; this involves trade-offs (discussed below). In terms of regionalization, the 
organizational form of a communal consortium enables the Division to take a hierarchical stance vis-à-vis its 
contractual partners as it wants to remain the authoritative entity. As the contract municipalities have no decision-
rights, this regional form weakens input-legitimacy.  
In terms of indicators not causally linked with regionalization or autonomization, this study found that there is 
informal negotiated rule-making via dialogue between the relevant actors (in the decision-making process within the 
Division, the WDR and the WWEA), which leads to a high level of input-legitimacy. This is aligned with the 
broader political processes in Switzerland, which are based on negotiations with an emphasis on gaining shared 
understandings (Klinke & Worch, under review). Furthermore, the WWEA seems to take a rather passive regulatory 
role as it no longer has subsidies as incentive tools, which weakens its accountability and hence also legitimacy. In 
contrast to some other cantons, like Berne, the WWEA does not have wastewater funds that are seen as useful 
enforcement tools. In Berne, for instance, the cantonal regulator is able to give municipalities a set of choices but 
link one choice with a funding incentive (using the wastewater funds). In addition, while experts in the Swiss water 
sector acknowledge that synergies can be reaped by integrating the governance of the wastewater and water supply 
sub-sectors, this is not realized by the WDR, which might weaken its organizational efficiency. Finally, in terms of 
problem-solving, the Division has a high level of performance as it complies with the water quality standards and 
meets the WWEA’s inspections - even over-achieving in terms of certain parameters, successfully keeping the 
wastewater separate from groundwater, streams, rivers and the lake of Zurich. 
Now moving on to the second research question regarding the trade-offs between efficiency, effectiveness and 
legitimacy, this research finds that regionalization and autonomization processes involve certain trade-offs between 
efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. Specifically, while through autonomization the Division has increased its 
effectiveness (in terms of increased decision-making competencies and flexibility), this weakens the Division’s 
input-legitimacy as the city of Zurich and hence the citizens have less influence over the Division’s operations. 
Conversely, the Division still feels like it is too tightly coupled with the city and wishes it had more autonomy. This 
exemplifies a tension between flexibility/autonomy (in terms of organizational and dynamic efficiency as well as 
effectiveness) on the one side and legitimacy via direct democracy on the other. The Division might be able to 
increase its performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness if it were even more decoupled from the political 
system. For instance, in terms of its aim to expand its organizational size and accomplish wastewater tasks from 
other municipalities, the Division seems to be restricted by the political system. The Division thus seems to struggle 
against the restrictive political system. This is aligned with other studies that have found that the larger 
municipalities in Switzerland tend to fight against political bodies’ opposition towards reform (Steiner, 2001). The 
importance of decoupling might be stronger in a canton like Zurich, which is described as being rather conservative 
and averse to NPM reforms, than in a canton like Berne where there have been major reforms at the cantonal and 
municipal level (Schedler, 2003). Yet the above mentioned legitimacy concerns would consequently play a stronger 
role in Zurich.  
In the context of the Swiss democratic system, where “comprehensive democratic compatibility” (Schedler, 
2003, p. 329) is a precursor to policymaking, the efficiency/effectiveness-legitimacy trade-off found in 
regionalization approaches may be offset due to institutional mechanisms that promote direct democracy. For 
instance, it was found that attempts to curb democratic rights in support of increased efficiency have been 
effectively challenged (Schedler, 2003). Moreover, recent experiences show that legitimacy deficits in regional 
governance forms are sought to be solved. For example, in the case of task-oriented associations (Zweckverbände), 
which are argued as having a legitimacy deficit because voters lack a direct voice regarding their operations (Glättli, 
2007), the cantonal constitution in Zurich was ratified in order to democratize these partnerships by creating a new 
institution within them that is comprised of the voters (i.e., giving them a direct voice) (Glättli, 2007). Thus, we 
argue that if the Division is perceived as having a strong legitimacy deficit, then measures might be taken to counter 
this. Yet this study provides insufficient information regarding the opinion of the citizens serviced by the Division to 
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judge whether or not there is a major democratic deficit in terms of the Division’s operations. The question that then 
arises is whether such a democratization process would defeat the original purpose of decoupling the management 
from political decision-making, as offsetting legitimacy deficits would entail a re-coupling with the political system. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper explored the performance of a Swiss wastewater utility in the context of regionalization. The findings 
indicate that establishing competencies and authority through the process of autonomization can lead to an increase 
in a utility’s organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, it is argued that autonomization might serve as a 
stepping stone for a utility to regionalize and thus increase its efficiency and effectiveness. Yet there is a notable 
trade-off with legitimacy because such processes tend to decrease direct democratic influence.  
A potential trajectory for the Division seems to be expanding its size and taking over the wastewater treatment 
tasks for smaller facilities. Despite the proliferation of regionalization arguments in Switzerland, this process is also 
viewed critically as it faces political and socio-cultural opposition because it often clashes with traditional municipal 
autonomy and other public values (e.g., direct democratic input). Regionalization is said to be particularly 
problematic around large utilities (e.g., Zurich and Geneva) because smaller municipalities have greater fear that 
they will loose autonomy if they collaborate with large municipalities than if they join with municipalities of a 
similar size. In the case of the Division, the contract municipalities lack decision-making rights; this hierarchical 
stance might be an impediment for the Division to expand more. While there are trade-offs with legitimacy 
indicators as the decoupling of management from political decision-making leads to less direct democratic 
influence, our study found that institutional measures were taken to offset legitimacy deficits in other instances (e.g., 
the reform of task-oriented associations in Zurich), which could also aid in regionalization trajectories. The open 
question is whether a balance between legitimacy and efficiency requirements could be found or whether the 
reforms to offset legitimacy deficits would bring the process full-circle (i.e., re-coupling)? 
Despite the widespread criticism that the traditional politics of the state are inadequate to handle today’s complex 
challenges, governmental oversight in the governance of public services remains essential (Theys, 2002). 
Specifically, reforms such as autonomization typically entail increased regulation (Rothenberger, 2002). Hence, an 
attempt to offset the trade-offs between efficiency/output-oriented effectiveness and legitimacy in Switzerland, 
without coming full-circle, may be to have increased hierarchical authority that is decoupled from the political 
system, e.g., an independent regulator. For instance, this research found that the WWEA’s regulatory competence 
seems to be restricted by the cantonal council. Perhaps a decoupling of the WWEA from the political system to 
become a more independent regulator would enable it to be a more effective regulatory player. While cantons prefer 
to encourage best practices through positive incentives (e.g., subsidies) than enforce strict mandates, having 
increased regulatory competence, in the form of more independent regulatory roles, could complement 
regionalization reforms as the cantons would have the competency to more effectively regulate (semi) autonomous 
entities at the regional level, which would strengthen legitimacy in terms of accountability. This then raises the 
question whether such decoupling of the cantonal water agencies would also be problematic as their legitimacy (in 
terms of democratic influence) would be decreased? What counter mechanisms would such decoupling necessitate 
(e.g., judicial review, independent expertise and public debate) in order to find a balance between efficiency, 
effectiveness and legitimacy? These questions merit further research. 
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